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LIVING AND DYING WITH A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD:




In February 2010, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
federal district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by Billy
Ray Alverson, an Oklahoma state prisoner sentenced to death for first-
degree murder. Among other allegations, Mr. Alverson contended that an
Oklahoma trial court had violated his due process rights under Ake v.
Oklahoma' by denying his request for funding for a neurological exami-
nation to assess the possible effects of head injuries that he had suffered
as a child.2 The state trial court had discounted the conclusion of a li-
censed clinical social worker that Mr. Alverson had shown signs of or-
ganic brain impairment and that further testing was warranted. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that ruling on appeal and
then denied post-conviction relief.3
Judge Paul Kelly dissented. In his view, the state trial court had
erred when it failed to approve funds for neuropsychological testing. He
reasoned that, "If Mr. Alverson had received a competent [neuropsy-
chological] evaluation, he very well could have presented evidence that
he was not a psychopath and that he suffered from an undiagnosed or-
ganic brain disorder reducing his culpability for his behavior."4 In that
event, Mr. Alverson would have been able to present this mitigating evi-
dence, and a jury might well have sentenced him to life imprisonment
rather than death.5
The contrasting opinions about the requested neuropsychological
evaluation in Alverson reflect an ongoing and evolving debate in the
t Adjunct Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University; Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert
H. Henry, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, 1994-2010. I would like to thank Judge
Henry for sixteen rewarding years in his chambers: it was an honor and a privilege to serve with
him. I would also like to thank Webster Cash, Lee Fanyo, and the advisors and editors of the Denver
University Law Review for their tireless work and their guidance. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my
wife Sheridan McCaffree, our children Robby and Aidan, and my mother Marjorie Ramana for their
love, encouragement, and support. My father, the late Dr. C.V. Ramana, inspired my interest in
mental health issues, and this article is dedicated to his memory.
1. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
2. See id. at 83.
3. Alverson v. Workman, 595 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Alverson v.
State, 983 P.2d 498, 511 n.34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999)).
4. Alverson, 595 F.3d at 1170 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
5. See id.
339
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Tenth Circuit's capital cases about the significance of evidence regarding
the defendant's mental health-which may include not only evidence of
organic brain damage but also evidence of cognitive impairments, mental
illness without a discrete organic cause, and evidence that the defendant
suffered "childhood privation and abuse."6
On the one hand, the court has stated that evidence like that con-
cerning Mr. Alverson's alleged organic brain disorder "is exactly the sort
... that garners the most sympathy from jurors" and that the significance
of this kind of evidence cannot be overstated.7 As a result, when a capital
defendant's counsel has failed to conduct an adequate investigation re-
garding that evidence and has then failed to present it during sentencing,
the Tenth Circuit has held that the defendant has been deprived of his
right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.8
Engaging in the two-part inquiry required by Strickland v. Washington,9
the court has concluded that (1) defense counsel "made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defen-
dant by the Sixth Amendment"10 and (2) counsel's errors rendered the
sentencing proceedings unreliable, thereby warranting a second hearing
at which the mitigating mental health evidence could be presented."
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has also concluded that this
same kind of evidence may constitute an aggravating circumstance that
supports the prosecution's contention that the defendant should be sen-
tenced to death.12 The court has characterized this evidence as "a double-
edged sword" and has held that counsel's failure to present it may well
be a legitimate strategy designed to save the defendant's life and that the
failure to present that evidence was thus not prejudicial. 13
These conflicting characterizations of mental health evidence pre-
sent considerable difficulties for capital defendants' counsel seeking to
craft an effective strategy during the sentencing phase, as well as for
reviewing courts that must assess that strategy under Sixth Amendment
standards. In this Article, I outline the mitigating and aggravating sides
of that "double-edged sword" by examining three of the Tenth Circuit's
decisions that have assessed the effects of counsel's failure to present
mental health evidence: Smith v. Mullin,14 Bryan v. Mullin,'5 and Wilson
6. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 943 (10th Cir. 2004).
7. See Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 131, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mullin, 379 F.3d
at 942).
8. See, e.g., Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1142-48; Mullin, 379 F.3d at 938-44.
9. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
10. Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1142.
11. See, e.g., id. at 1142-48; Mullin, 379 F.3d at 938-44.
12. See, e.g., Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1244-50 (10th Cir. 2008); Bryan v. Mullin,
335 F.3d 1207, 1222-23 nn.21-22 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970,
980 (10th Cir. 2001).
13. See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1222 n.21; McCracken, 268 F.3d at 980.
14. 379 F.3d 919 (2004).
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v. Sirmons.16 The cases reach different results. Smith concludes that it
was patently unreasonable for counsel to fail to present the mental health
evidence and that there was a reasonable probability that at least one
juror would have returned a life sentence if he or she had heard the evi-
dence that counsel failed to present. In contrast, Bryan holds that in light
of the "double-edged" quality of similar mental health evidence, counsel
made a reasonable strategic decision to withhold the evidence from the
jury. Wilson concludes that, in light of the particular record before it, an
evidentiary hearing is required to assess the significance of the mental
health evidence.
Each approach is supported by Supreme Court precedent and em-
pirical studies, both of which conclude that mental health evidence may
be both mitigating and aggravating. In my view, that ambiguity, or "dou-
ble-edgedness," suggests a heightened role for the factfinder-either a
state court assessing a post-conviction Sixth Amendment claim for inef-
fective assistance of counsel based on the failure to present mental health
evidence or a federal district court adjudicating a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ha-
beas corpus petition and, in some instances, vested with discretion to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on such a claim. In the final section of
this Article, I suggest that a more fact-based approach to the assessment
of mental health evidence may help to resolve some of the apparent in-
consistencies triggered by the doubled-edged characterization.
A. The Mitigating Edge in Smith v. Mullin
The circuit's decision in Smith v. Mullin highlights the mitigating
edge of mental health evidence.' 7 After a jury convicted Roderick Smith
of the first-degree murder of his wife and four young stepchildren, rec-
ommending sentences of death (which the trial court imposed), Mr.
Smith alleged in post-conviction proceedings in both state and federal
court that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing,
in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In particular, Mr. Smith as-
serted that his trial counsel did not understand that his client's borderline
mental retardation, mental illness, and organic brain impairment could be
presented to the jury as grounds for rejecting a death sentence. Both the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and the federal district court re-
jected that claim.
15. 335 F.3d 1207 (2003).
16. 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008), affdon reh'g en banc sub nom. Wilson v. Workman, 577
F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009). On rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit held:
[T]he panel in Wilson was correct in its holding that AEDPA deference does not apply
when, pursuant to [Oklahoma Appellate] Rule 3.11, the [Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals] decides an ineffective assistance of counsel claim without consideration of
non-record evidence that, "if true and not contravened by the existing factual record,
would entitle the petitioner to habeas relief' under Strickland.
Wilson, 577 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998)). 1 do
not consider that part of the Wilson holding in this Article.
17. Smith, 379 F.3d at 939-44.
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The federal district court concluded that Mr. Smith's counsel's fail-
ure to present mitigating evidence constituted deficient performance,
thereby establishing the first component of the Strickland inquiry.' 8
However, it further concluded that counsel's failure to present mental
health evidence was not prejudicial, reasoning that Mr. Smith's mental
illness "tend[ed] to portray [Mr. Smith] as an unstable individual with
very little control over his impulses" and would have "negated much of
the mitigation evidence actually presented to the jury of [Mr. Smith's]
good work history and friend's and relatives perception of [Mr. Smith] as
a kind hearted person." 9 In short, in the district court's view, the mental
health evidence offered by Mr. Smith at the evidentiary hearing was
"double-edged" and thus did not warrant the grant of habeas corpus re-
lief.20
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Mr. Smith's
counsel's performance was deficient. That conclusion was based in part
on the statement of Mr. Smith's trial counsel, who admitted at the evi-
dentiary hearing "[a]stoundingly," that he was unaware that evidence of
Mr. Smith's mental illness could be offered in support of the contention
that a death sentence was not justified.21 Because of that misunderstand-
ing, counsel invoked only mitigating circumstances that involved Mr.
Smith's surrender and confession to the police, his expression of re-
morse, the fact that he had not attempted to flee, a lack of stab wounds
on some of the victims, and the fact that his life had value to his friends
and family.22
Despite this rather cursory argument for a life sentence, there was
significant evidence regarding Mr. Smith's mental health that his counsel
could have presented. At the federal evidentiary hearing, Mr. Smith's
counsel established that his client was completely illiterate, that his IQ
was in the mentally retarded or borderline mentally retarded range, and
that his cognitive abilities and his emotional development resembled that
of a twelve-year-old child.23 In addition, when he was a child, Mr. Smith
had nearly drowned, and he had suffered brain damage as a result.24 At
the evidentiary hearing, a neuropsychologist testified that the near
drowning could cause damage to those areas of the brain that are in-
18. See id. at 939.
19. Id. at 943 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
20. Id. at 943 n. II (discussing the following Tenth Circuit decisions invoked by the district
court in support of the characterization of mental health evidence as "double-edged"); see also
McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 980 (10th Cir. 2001); Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1277-
78 (10th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259, 1282 (10th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Exec. Dir. of
Dep't of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 761 (10th Cir. 1996)).
21. Smith, 379 F.3d at 939.
22. See id. at 940.
23. Id. at 941.
24. Id.
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volved in emotional regulation. 25 About individuals who have suffered
such injuries, he explained:
[T]heir emotional regulation is also disrupted, and so their behavior
becomes erratic or out of control or aggressive, and any number of
emotional problems can result that are usually not consistent with
whatever is going on in the environment around them, and that repre-
sents the direct cause of the brain injury, as well as an inability to
cope or interact with stress or what's going on in the environment in
a way that most of us would see to be reasonable or prudent or under-
standable. 26
In addition, Mr. Smith's mother offered testimony at the evidentiary
hearing that corroborated the neuropsychologist's conclusions about the
effect of the oxygen loss on Mr. Smith's mental functioning. She ex-
plained that Mr. Smith became "slower . .. [and] didn't act like he un-
derstood whatever I said to him." 2 7 These changes resulted in Mr. Smith
being tormented by other children. He eventually finished high school
but lived with his mother until he moved in with his wife and her four
children.28
In contrast to the district court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Mr.
Smith's failure to present this mental health evidence to the jury at sen-
tencing was prejudicial under the Strickland standard-there was a rea-
sonable probability that, if the mental health evidence introduced at the
evidentiary hearing had been offered at sentencing, the jury would have
concluded that the "balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
did not warrant death."29 In that context, a reasonable probability meant
less than a preponderance of the evidence, but a probability "sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."30
The Smith panel's conclusions as to deficient performance and
prejudice are grounded in Supreme Court precedent regarding the pres-
entation of mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. Ac-
cordingly, in order to elucidate the Smith decision as well as subsequent
circuit decisions that focus on the mitigating edge of mental health evi-
dence, I briefly outline the precedent that Smith applies.
1. Mitigating Evidence After Woodson v. North Carolina3 1
The path to the Smith panel's conclusion that "evidence of [his]
mental retardation, brain damage, and troubled background constituted
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (alteration in original).
28. Id. at 941-42.
29. Id. at 942 (quoting Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000)).
30. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942 (quoting Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002)).
31. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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mitigating evidence" 3 2 begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
Woodson v. North Carolina. There, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion
concluded that a state statute that made death the mandatory sentence for
all persons convicted of first-degree murder violated the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, in part because
the statute "fail[ed] to allow the particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before
the imposition upon him of a sentence of death."3 3 The Court explained:
[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind
rather than degree. A process that accords no significance to relevant
facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration .
. . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted
of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the
blind infliction of the penalty of death. 34
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio,35 a plurality of the Court applied
those principles to a state statute that required a death sentence unless the
sentencing judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that one
of several specific mitigating factors existed.3 6 In concluding that the
statute violated the Eighth Amendment, the plurality explained:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer,
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from con-
sidering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.37
Then, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,38 the Court applied Woodson and
Lockett to a sentencing proceeding in which the judge had ruled as a mat-
ter of law that he could not consider the circumstances of a sixteen-year-
old capital defendant's troubled childhood. 39 The Court held that the re-
32. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942.
33. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
34. Id at 303-04 (citations omitted).
35. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
36. Id. at 607 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1975)). Three of the factors
to consider are whether: (1) "The victim of the offense induced or facilitated [the offense]"; (2) "It is
unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under
duress, coercion, or strong provocation"; (3) "The offense was primarily the product of the of-
fender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the de-
fense of insanity." § 299.04(B)(1}-(3).
37. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted).
38. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
39. Id. at 111- 14. At sentencing, the defendant's juvenile officer testified that the defendant's
parent had divorced when the defendant was five years old, that the defendant had lived without
supervision, that his "mother was an alcoholic and possibly a prostitute," and that his father had used
excessive physical punishment. Id. at 107.
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fusal to consider those circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment, as
construed by Lockett: "Just as the State may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sen-
tencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evi-
dence." 4 0 The evidence at issue was "relevant mitigating evi-
dence."41 Although in some cases, the Court stated:
[S]uch evidence properly may be given little weight.. . . [W]hen the
defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense there can be no
doubt that evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a
harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly rele-
42vant.
The Court subsequently explained that even "rather atypical" miti-
gating evidence may not be excluded, for example evidence that a
defendant had a "habit of inhaling gasoline fumes" and "had once
passed out" as a result, that after this incident "his mind tended to
wander," that he "had been one of seven children in a poor fam-
ily," "that his father had died of cancer," and, "that he had been "a
fond and affectionate uncle.A 3
In Penry v. Lynaugh,44 the Court offered a further explanation of the
significance of mental health evidence. The defendant there had pre-
sented evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood, but the
trial court's instructions did not adequately instruct the jury on how to
consider that information. 45 Concluding that the sentencing proceeding
had violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court stated that "[u]nderlying
Lockett and Eddings is the principle that punishment should be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant." 46
"[E]vidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant
because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background,
or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defen-
dants who have no such excuse." 47
40. Id at 113-14.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Idatll5.
43. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 249 (2007) (discussing the mitigating evidence
in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987)).
44. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
45. Penry, 492 at 312. Instead, the instructions directed the jury to consider only the following
questions in determining an appropriate sentence: (1) did the defendant act deliberately when he
murdered the defendant?; (2) was there a probability that the defendant would be dangerous in the
future?; and (3) did the defendant act unreasonably in response to provocation? Id. at 310.
46. Id.at319.
47. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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2. Williams and Wiggins
Although Woodson, Lockett, Eddings, and Penry establish that Mr.
Smith was entitled to present evidence regarding his cognitive impair-
ments, brain damage, and difficult childhood, two more recent cases pro-
vided the Tenth Circuit with direct guidance regarding his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim: Williams v. Taylor48 and Wiggins v. Smith.49
In Williams, the defendant's trial counsel had offered as mitigating
evidence at sentencing only "the testimony of the [defendant's] mother,
,50
two neighbors, and a taped excerpt from a statement by a psychiatrist."
The mother and neighbors described the defendant as a "nice boy" and
"not a violent person." 51 The psychiatrist reported a statement by the
defendant that during an earlier robbery the defendant had removed the
bullets from a gun so that he would not hurt anyone.52 During closing
argument, the defendant's attorney requested the jury to spare his life
because the defendant had turned himself in to the police.53 However, in
state post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Williams offered substantial evi-
dence of a "nightmarish childhood" and a diagnosis of "borderline men-
tally retarded." 54 In addition, post-conviction counsel established that the
defendant's parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of their
children and that the defendant, Williams had been severely beaten by
his father. 55 The defendant also submitted evidence of his good behavior
while incarcerated. 56
Concluding that the Virginia Supreme Court had unreasonably ap-
plied federal law, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had estab-
lished both components of his claim for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. With regard to counsel's deficient performance, the Court con-
cluded that counsel's failure to introduce voluminous amounts of miti-
gating evidence was not a tactical decision. As to prejudice, the Court
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court had misread Strickland59 and
had also failed to evaluate the totality of mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant. In the Court's view, "the graphic description of Wil-
48. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
49. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).




54. Id. at 395-96.
55. Id. at 395.
56. Id. at 396.
57. Id. at 396-97.
58. Id. at 396.
59. Williams, 529 at 391. In particular, in the Supreme Court's view, the Virginia Supreme
Court had erred in holding that Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) had modified the standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in Strickland.
60. Williams, 529 at 397.
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liams' childhood, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he
was 'borderline mentally retarded,' might well have influenced the jury's
appraisal of his moral culpability."61 This evidence supported the conten-
tion that the defendant's behavior was "a compulsive reaction rather than
the product of cold-blooded premeditation." 62
Similarly, in Wiggins, during the state court sentencing proceedings,
the defendant's counsel failed to challenge the prosecution's arguments
for the death penalty with available evidence regarding the defendant's
mental health.63 In state post-conviction proceedings, the defendant of-
fered a social history report prepared by a licensed social worker and
based upon records from social service agencies, medical facilities and
schools.64 The report found that the defendant's mother was a chronic
alcoholic who frequently left her children at home, "forcing them to beg
for food and to eat paint chips and garbage."65 The mother's abusive
conduct, which included beating the defendant and holding his hand on a
hot stove, led to his placement in foster care at age six, where he was
subjected to physical and sexual abuse.66 At sixteen, the defendant ran
away from his foster home and began living on the streets. 67
As in Williams, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant
had established both components of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.68 As to the deficient performance prong, the Court cited state
practice standards69 as well as the American Bar Association standards
for capital defense work, which provide that investigations of mitigating
evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that
may be introduced by the prosecutor." 70 In light of those standards, the
Court held that Mr. Wiggins' counsel's investigation of mitigating cir-
cumstances was unreasonably narrow in scope.71 The evidence subse-
quently compiled in the state post-conviction proceedings (documenting
61. Id. at 398.
62. Id
63. Instead, the defendant's counsel requested bifurcation of the sentencing proceedings.
Counsel sought to first argue that the defendant did not kill the victim with his own hand and then to
argue, in a second phase of the sentencing, that psychological reports and expert testimony demon-
strated that the defendant had limited intellectual capacity and had not engaged in an aggressive
pattern of behavior. When the judge denied the request for bifurcation, counsel made a proffer re-
garding this evidence. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515-16 (2003).
64. Id. at 516.
65. Id. at 516-17.
66. Id. at 517.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 535.
69. "[S]tandard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins' trial included the
preparation of a social history report." Id. at 524.
70. Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1(C), at 93 (1989)).
71. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
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Mr. Wiggins' "excruciating life history") was readily available to his
trial counsel. 72
As to prejudice, the Court observed that the sentencing jury heard
evidence of only one mitigating factor-that Mr. Wiggins had no prior
convictions. 73 The information in the life history report was a "powerful
mitigating narrative.",74 In addition, in contrast to other defendants (par-
ticularly the petitioner in Williams v. Taylor), Mr. Wiggins did not have a
record of violent conduct that could be used to rebut the evidence in the
life history report. Accordingly, if the evidence in that report had been
introduced to the jury, there was a reasonable probability that at least one
juror would have declined to impose the death penalty. 76
3. Smith's Application of Williams and Wiggins
In concluding that Mr. Smith had established both the deficient per-
formance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis, the Tenth Cir-
cuit applied Williams and Wiggins.77 Observing that both Supreme Court
decisions cited the ABA Guidelines statement that mental health evi-
dence is "of vital importance to the jury's decision at the punishment
phase,"78 the Smith panel noted that the defendant's counsel had failed to
offer any mental health evidence at sentencing. 79 Thus, his performance
was clearly deficient under Williams, Wiggins, and the ABA Guide-
lines.8 0
With regard to prejudice, the Tenth Circuit explained that the cir-
cumstances in Mr. Smith's case were "quite similar" to those in Wil-
liams.81 In both cases, counsel's failure to present mental health evidence
meant that the jury never received an explanation for the defendant's
conduct.82 In both cases, the evidence that counsel failed to present was
"consistent with the view that [the offense conduct] was a compulsive
reaction rather than the product of cold-blooded premeditation." 83The
Tenth Circuit also noted that the evidence presented to the jury in Wil-
liams in support of the death penalty was quite strong, as it was in Mr.
Smith's case.84 Nevertheless, as in Williams and Wiggins, the fact that
the mitigation case presented by Mr. Smith's counsel at sentencing was
72. Id. at 537-38.




77. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 944.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 943.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000)).
84. Smith, 379 F.3d at 944.
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"pitifully incomplete, and in some respects, bordered on the absurd,"
when combined with the fact that the mental health evidence subse-
quently presented offered a compelling explanation for his behavior-
was sufficient to undermine the Tenth Circuit's confidence in the death
sentence and therefore establish prejudice.
4. Supporting Empirical Evidence
In addition to Williams and Wiggins, the Smith panel invoked find-
ings by social scientists regarding the effect of mental health evidence on
jurors in capital cases. According to the court, the mental health evidence
that Mr. Smith's counsel failed to present "is exactly the sort of evidence
that garners the most sympathy from jurors." 86
First, the court cited the conclusions of a death penalty expert who
testified at the federal evidentiary hearing that jurors "respond to and
find mitigating [this type of evidence,] and [they] are more likely to vote
for life rather than death sentences in cases where there is . . . clear and
clearly presented evidence that the defendant has suffered some form of
mental illness." Next, the court cited a report from the Capital Jury
Project about interviews with 153 jurors from forty-one capital murder
cases in South Carolina. With regard to mental health evidence, the
jurors in the study were asked about the effects of evidence that: (1) "the
killing was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance"; (2) "the defendant had a history of mental illness";
and (3) the defendant was mentally retarded.89 In reporting the results,
Professor Garvey characterized these three categories of mental health
evidence as examples of reduced culpability.90 Within that broad cate-
gory, he distinguished "proximate reduced culpability" from "remote
reduced culpability." 91 "Evidence of 'proximate' reduced culpability is
evidence that 'suggests any impairment of a defendant's capacity to con-
trol his or her criminal behavior, or to appreciate its wrongfulness or
likely consequences."' 92 Remote reduced culpability involves the defen-
dant's character. It includes evidence that the defendant was abused as a
child as well as "other deprivations that may have helped shape the de-
fendant into the kind of person for whom a capital crime was a conceiv-
able course of action." 93 As Professor Garvey explains, "[P]roximate
85. Id.
86. Id. at 942.
87. Id. (alterations in original).
88. Id. (citing Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1559 (1998)).
89. Garvey, supra note 88, at 1564-65.
90. Id. at 1562.
91. Id
92. Id. (quoting Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the
Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 846 (1992) (book review)).
93. Id.
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reduced culpability speaks to the defendant's lack of responsibility for
what he has done; remote reduced culpability speaks to his lack of re-
sponsibility for who he is."94 All three questions about the defendant's
mental retardation or mental illness involved "proximate reduced culpa-
bility."95
The jurors' responses indicated that mental retardation had the
strongest mitigating effect: 44.3% of them reported that they were much
less likely to vote for the death penalty if this factor was present, and
29.5% stated that they would be slightly less likely to vote for the death
penalty.96 A history of mental illness or a particular mental illness that
influenced the defendant during the killing were not afforded the same
significance as evidence of mental retardation, but those factors were still
regarded as having substantial mitigating effect: 26.7% of responding
jurors stated that they would be much less likely to return a death sen-
tence if the defendant had a history of mental illness, while 29.5% re-
ported that they would be slightly less likely to do so.97 If the killing was
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance, the responding jurors reported approximately the same mitigating
effect: 24.5% stated that they would be much less likely to vote for the
death penalty, and 30.1% stated that they would be slightly less likely to
vote for it.98 Notably, the South Carolina jurors described other factors
related to the defendant's mental health as significantly less mitigating.
Only 18.5% ascribed any significant mitigating effect to the fact that the
killing was committed under the influence of drugs and only 18.3% as-
cribed any such effect to the fact that the killing was committed under
the influence of alcohol. 99 Similarly, with regard to evidence that the
defendant had been seriously abused as a child and that the defendant
had suffered extreme poverty as a child-examples of "remote reduced
culpability" in Professor Garvey's scheme-the jurors reported a simi-
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 1564-65.
96. Id. at 1559. 23.5% of the responding jurors reported that they were just as likely to vote
for the death penalty if the defendant was mentally retarded; 2.0% reported that they would be
slightly more likely to vote for the death penalty in that circumstance, while 0.7% reported that they
would be much more likely to vote for the death penalty. Id.
97. Id. 40.4% of the responding jurors stated that such evidence of mental illness would have
no effect, 2.1% stated that such evidence would make them slightly more likely to vote for the death
penalty, while 1.4% stated that the evidence would make them much more likely to vote for the
death penalty. Id.
98. Id at 1555. 37.1% of the responding jurors stated that they would be just as likely to
impose the death penalty, 4.9 % stated that they would be slightly more likely to impose the death
penalty, while 3.5% stated that they would be much more likely to impose the death penalty in this
circumstance.
99. Id. at 1565. In particular, 6.2% of jurors reported that they would be much less likely to
impose a death sentence if the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of the killing,
while 12.3% reported that they would be slightly less likely to impose the death penalty in that
circumstance. Id. at 1555. With regard to a defendant under the influence of alcohol, the percentages
were 6.1 and 12.2. Id. Both questions involve "proximate reduced culpability" in Professor Garvey's
scheme. Id. at 1562.
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larly limited mitigating effect.'00 A third of the jurors would ascribe some
mitigating effect to evidence that the defendant had been seriously
abused as a child, while only 15% gave any significance to the fact that
the defendant grew up in extreme poverty. o1
The Smith court also cited a study reporting national polling data on
attitudes toward the death penalty. The study found the fact that the de-
fendant was mentally retarded "much more" mitigating than other fac-
tors.102
5. Rejection of the District Court's Double-Edged Sword Analysis
Finally, the Smith court rejected the district court's application of
circuit precedent to find that evidence of Mr. Smith's mental illness and
troubled childhood was "double-edged." The district court had reasoned
that this evidence (which was offered at the federal evidentiary hearing)
tended to portray Mr. Smith "as an unstable individual with very little
control over his impulses" and would have "negated much of the mitiga-
tion evidence actually presented to the jury of [Mr. Smith's] good work
history and friend's and relatives perception of [Mr. Smith] as a kind
hearted person.,,t3 In the Tenth Circuit's view, these statements failed to
acknowledge the fundamental purpose of presenting mitigating mental
health evidence: to provide an explanation of how Mr. Smith's mental
illness caused him to commit such a horrific crime. In addition, the Smith
panel reasoned that the district court had misread circuit precedent. In the
cases cited by the district court to support the double-edged characteriza-
tion of Mr. Smith's evidence, the excluded mental health evidence would
have placed other evidence of the defendant's aggressive and violent
behavior before the jury, thereby undermining the mitigating effect.1 04 In
contrast, in Mr. Smith's case, the jury had already heard evidence of the
"aggravating edge" of Mr. Smith's mental impairments. 05
100. Id. at 1562.
101. Id. at 1565.
102. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Samuel R. Gross, Update:
American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448,
1468-69 (1998)).
103. Smith, 379 F.3d at 943 (alterations in original).
104. Id. at 943 n.1 I (citing McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 979-80 (10th Cir. 2001);
Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259, 1282
(10th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep't of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 760-61 (10th Cir. 1996)).
105. Mullin, 379 F.3d at 943 n.1 1. In its subsequent decision in Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d
131 (10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit followed Smith's analysis closely in holding that the defen-
dant's counsel's failure to present mental health evidence was both deficient and prejudicial. The
mental health evidence there included testimony that the defendant "was raised in an environment of
neglect and abuse," suffered from brain damage, and drug use, which the defendant had tried to
overcome. Id. at 1143-44. The court explained that the defendant's brain damage might be perceived
by lay persons as 'meanness' or antisocial behavior, but with expert evaluation and explanation is
properly explained as deriving from disruption and impairments to the nervous system." Id. "Al-
though the case against [the defendant] was strong and the murders in this case were horrific," the
Tenth Circuit stated, "courts have not hesitated to grant relief in similar circumstances where the
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
B. The Aggravating Edge in Bryan v. Mullin' 06
In Bryan v. Mullin, a case decided one year before Smith, the Tenth
Circuit characterized the mental health evidence in a capital case in much
different terms. Like Mr. Smith, Robert Leroy Bryan was convicted of
first-degree murder in an Oklahoma state court. The victim was Mr.
Bryan's aunt, whose signature Mr. Bryan had attempted to forge on
promissory notes and agreements purporting to pay him millions of dol-
lars. Mr. Bryan had a history of organic brain disease, which may have
been related to a severe case of diabetes. Four years before the murder of
his aunt, Mr. Bryan had been charged with solicitation to commit another
murder. In that prior case, the trial judge initially found Mr. Bryan in-
competent to stand trial and sent him to a state psychiatric facility for
treatment. There, psychiatrists concluded that Mr. Bryan suffered from
an organic delusional disorder and was severely psychotic when he was
first admitted to the hospital. They further concluded that Mr. Bryan's
brain exhibited significant signs of atrophy. The psychiatrists treated him
with an antipsychotic drug, and they then determined him to be compe-
tent.
After unsuccessfully challenging Mr. Bryan's competency, a public
defender filed a notice that he intended to rely on an insanity defense.
Mr. Bryan and his parents stated that they did not want to rely on that
defense, and Mr. Bryan then hired new counsel. Neither at the guilt
phase nor at sentencing did the retained counsel present any mental
health evidence on behalf of Mr. Bryan.
After the Oklahoma state courts affirmed Mr. Bryan's conviction
and death sentence, Mr. Bryan filed a federal habeas corpus action alleg-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to present men-
tal health evidence during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. At
an evidentiary hearing before the district court, Mr. Bryan offered a re-
port from a psychiatrist that concluded that Mr. Bryan suffered from an
"extensive paranoid delusional system [and] fragmentation of
thought." 0 7 Similarly, a psychologist found that Mr. Bryan "suffer[ed]
from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question . .. his
legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged." 08 A brain scan
revealed that Mr. Bryan suffered from multiple areas of irreversible brain
damage.109
Despite this information, which seemed to resemble what the Smith
panel deemed "the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from
absence of available mitigation evidence left the jury with a 'pitifully incomplete' picture of the
defendant." Id. at I148 (quoting Smith, 379 F.3d at 944).
106. 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
107. Id. at 1230 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id
109. Id. at 1231.
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jurors," 0 the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's
denial of Mr. Bryan's ineffective assistance of counsel claim."' As to the
guilt phase, the court concluded that the evidence available to Mr.
Bryan's counsel at the time of the trial demonstrated that Mr. Bryan did
not have a viable insanity defense.1 2 As to the sentencing phase, the
court held that the record indicated that Mr. Bryan's counsel understood
the propriety of introducing mental health evidence as mitigation at sen-
tencing, but that his counsel had made a reasonable strategic decision not
to present the evidence-one that was "virtually unchallengeable" under
the Strickland standard for determining whether counsel's performance
was deficient.l" 3
In the court's view, counsel had two legitimate reasons not to pre-
sent the mental health evidence. First, Mr. Bryan's counsel "was con-
cerned that testimony by either [the psychiatrist or the psychologist]
might play into the prosecution's case that Bryan was a continuing threat
to society."'14 In support of that concern, the court invoked an admission
during the cross-examination of one of Mr. Bryan's attorneys during the
federal district court hearing. Mr. Bryan's counsel answered in the af-
firmative to the questions, "[E]vidence of a psychological problem with
the defendant . . . sometimes can be a double-edged sword in a capital
case?"" 5 Mr. Bryan's counsel was asked a second question: "[O]ften a
jury might accept evidence of a psychological or emotional problem as
evidence of aggravation?""' 6 Mr. Bryan's counsel acknowledged that,
"I've had that happen in several cases.""17 Second, Mr. Bryan's counsel
believed that relying on the mental health evidence would be inconsistent
with his defense in the guilt phase-that the prosecution had failed to
prove that Mr. Bryan had committed the offense. In the court's view, Mr.
Bryan's counsel had a reasonable concern that "an about-face during the
penalty phase might compromise Bryan in the eyes of the jurors."" 8
Four circuit judges disagreed with that analysis.'" However, as with
Smith, there is Supreme Court precedent that supports the Bryan major-
110. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942.
Ill. Bryan, 335 F.3d at l211.
112. Id. at 1219-20.
113. Id at 1223-24; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
114. Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1222.
115. Id. at 1222n.21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1223.
119. In the view of the dissent, "Mr. Bryan's counsel provided the most ineffective defense I
have ever seen, amounting to a concession of guilt and relating none of the reams of compelling
mitigating evidence." Id. at 1225 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As to the
deficient performance component of the Strickland inquiry, the dissent concluded that Mr. Bryan's
counsel "made no attempt to provide the jury with the 'particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant."' Id. at 1245 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976)). As to prejudice, the dissent concluded that "[t]he compelling and exten-
sive evidence of Mr. Bryan's history of mental illness creates a reasonable probability that the jury
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ity's characterization of mental health evidence as an aggravating cir-
cumstance.
1. Strickland v. Washington, Burger v. Kemp,12 0 and Penry v. Ly-
naugh
In Strickland-the decision that establishes the governing standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims-the Supreme Court recog-
nized that alleged mitigating evidence may also have an aggravating
edge. 12 1 There, in preparing for a capital sentencing proceeding, the de-
fendant's counsel conducted a very limited investigation. He spoke to the
defendant about his background, and spoke by telephone with the defen-
dant's wife and mother. Counsel did not search for character witnesses,
and he did not request a psychological report. The defendant's counsel
later explained that his conversations with his client did not indicate that
the client had psychological problems.1 22
In post-conviction proceedings, the defendant alleged that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel in part because his attorney had
failed to request a psychiatric report and had failed to investigate and
present character witnesses.' 23 The defendant submitted affidavits from
friends, neighbors, and relatives as well as reports from a psychiatrist and
psychologist stating that although he was not under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance, he was "chronically frustrated
and depressed because of his economic dilemma at the time of his
*,,124cnmes.
After announcing a standard for assessing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Court applied it and found neither deficient perform-
ance nor prejudice.12 5 As to prejudice, it reasoned that the evidence prof-
fered in the post-conviction proceedings "would barely have altered the
sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge" and would
"[i]ndeed. .. even have been harmful to his case: his 'rap sheet' would
probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological reports
would have directly contradicted [the defendant's] claim [at sentencing]
that the mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance ap-
plied to his case." 26
Three years later, in Burger v. Kemp, the Court engaged in similar
reasoning. The defendant, who was seventeen at the time of the murder
would have concluded that the mitigating evidence outweighed the continuing threat aggravator and
might also be viewed in a mitigating light as to past violent behavior." Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1245.
120. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
121. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
122. Id. at 672-73.
123. Id. at 675.
124. Id. at 675-76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 687-99.
126. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
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of which he was convicted, alleged that he had received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel because his attorney had failed to present evidence that
the defendant had "an exceptionally unhappy and unstable childhood" 2 7
during which one of his stepfathers had beaten his mother in his presence
and the other had encouraged him to take drugs. 128 At the time counsel
was appointed, the defendant had an IQ of 82, functioned as a 12-year-
old, and had been diagnosed as having psychological problems.' 2 9 Never-
theless, in holding that the defendant had not received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, the Court concluded that the attorney's decision "not to
mount an all-out investigation into [the defendant's] background in
search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable profes-
sional judgment."' 3 0
The Court explained that the record at sentencing established that
the defendant had no adult criminal record.131 Information concerning the
defendant's troubled childhood could have revealed information about
his use of drugs, various encounters with law enforcement, and his vio-
lent tendencies. The latter evidence could have undermined the defen-
dant's contention in the guilt phase of the trial that he acted under the
influence of a codefendant. The Court endorsed the reasoning of the dis-
trict judge who conducted a hearing on the defendant's habeas corpus
claim:
On one hand, a jury could react with sympathy over the tragic child-
hood [the defendant] endured. On the other hand, since [the defen-
dant's] sanity was not at issue in this case, the prosecution could use
this same testimony, after pointing out that [the defendant] was nev-
ertheless responsible for his acts, to emphasize that it was this same
unpredictable propensity for violence which played a prominent role
in the death of [the] victim. 132
Although it does not involve an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the Court's decision in Penry expresses a similar view of mental
health evidence. In holding that a Texas jury was not properly instructed
on the significance of mental retardation as mitigating evidence, the
Court explained that "[the defendant's] mental retardation and history of
abuse [was] thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthi-
ness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he
will be dangerous in the future." 33
127. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 789 (1987).
128. Id. at 790.
129. Id. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 794.
131. Id. at 790.
132. Id at 794.
133. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
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2. Tenth Circuit Decisions Supporting Bryan's Double-Edged View
When the en banc panel decided Bryan, several circuit decisions
had already concluded that evidence of a defendant's mental illness
could be double-edged and that counsel's failure to present it was neither
deficient nor prejudicial under Strickland. The circuit's cases explained
the aggravating effects of this evidence in varying terms.
First, according to the court's decisions, the omitted evidence might
depict the defendant as impulsive and violent and thus more likely to
constitute a continuing threat to society, a characterization often argued
by the prosecution as an aggravating circumstance in support of the death
penalty. For example, in Cannon v. Gibson,134 cited by the Bryan major-
ity, 35 the court concluded that the defendant's brain damage and result-
ing mental disorder, which prevented him from using appropriate judg-
ment, might "have negated much of the mitigation evidence actually
adduced by trial counsel" and might have supported the prosecution's
contention that the defendant was a continuing threat.' 36
The circuit has also held that omitted mental health evidence may
reveal particular incidents of violent or antisocial behavior, thus under-
mining the defendant's mitigation arguments.'3 7 In this sense, the evi-
dence may contradict a particular theme that the defendant has previ-
ously asserted. For example, in Cannon v. Gibson, the court observed
that the defendant had presented mitigation evidence regarding his ex-
emplary work history, acts of kindness, his strong and continuing at-
tachment to his young daughter, his lack of a prior criminal record, and
his good conduct as a prisoner. 38 By depicting the defendant as an un-
stable individual lacking impulse control, the omitted evidence would
have undermined those arguments for a life sentence.'
39
134. 259 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2001).
135. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1222 (2003) (en banc).
136. Cannon, 259 F.3d at 1277-78. Other Tenth Circuit decisions have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 978-80 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
omitted evidence of the defendant's psychological problems, including a diagnosis of bipolar disor-
der, substance abuse, borderline and antisocial personality disorders, and multiple severe bouts of
depression and had exhibited suicidal thoughts and tendencies would have revealed the defendant's
impulsive and violent character and "could have bolstered the jury's conclusion that [the defendant]
represented a continuing threat to society (a factor ... [the defendant] vigorously disputed during the
[sentencing] proceedings)").
137. See, e.g., Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 782 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that
"[t]estimony concerning [the defendant's] substance abuse would have resulted in the introduction of
details of [his] prior convictions and violent conduct, which invariably resulted from his substance
abuse" and that "[tihe jury could have perceived such evidence as aggravating rather than mitigat-
ing").
138. Cannon, 259 F.3d at 1277.
139. Id. at 1277-78.
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C. Wilson v. Sirmons: Rounding the Edges
The circuit's decisions in Smith and Bryan adopt contrasting ap-
proaches to mental health evidence that are difficult to harmonize. As
noted above, in post-conviction proceedings both defendants offered
evidence of severe mental illness that their attorneys did not present at
sentencing. Yet the court viewed the evidence of Mr. Smith's organic
brain damage as humanizing him and potentially explaining "a shocking
crime." 4 0 On the other hand, Mr. Bryan's counsel viewed his illness as
supporting the prosecution's contention that he was a continuing threat to
society and thus deserved the death penalty, and the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that that assessment was reasonable.14' Although there are impor-
tant differences in the facts of the two cases-particularly the resistance
of Mr. Bryan and his family to the presentation of the mental health evi-
dence, which was not shared by Mr. Smith and his family 4 2 -those dif-
ferences do not seem sufficient to justify such different results.
To be sure, the difficulty is not merely a matter of the circuit's
precedent. The Supreme Court's decisions in Eddings, Burger, and Penry
characterize mental health evidence resembling that offered by Mr.
Smith and Mr. Bryan as mitigating, aggravating, or both. The Court's
decisions "call[] for a greater degree of reliability when the death sen-
tence is imposed," 4 3 but that degree of reliability seems difficult to ob-
tain when one must assess the effect of omitted mental health evidence
on a capital jury.
Although it does not completely resolve the tension between Smith
and Bryan, the circuit's 2008 decision in Wilson v. Sirmons offers sub-
stantial guidance for assessing mental health evidence in capital cases. I
read Wilson to call for more thorough scrutiny of counsel's decisions to
forgo the presentation of mental health evidence, as well as a more fact-
intensive approach to assessing the prejudicial effect of failing to intro-
duce such evidence-including the determination of whether the evi-
dence was indeed a double-edged sword. I first examine the Wilson deci-
sion and then consider its significance to the law of the circuit.
1. The Decision in Wilson
An Oklahoma jury convicted Michael Lee Wilson of first-degree
murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon.144 The victim was a clerk
at a convenience store where Mr. Wilson also worked.14 5 The jury found
140. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 943 (10th Cir. 2004).
141. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1220 (2003) (en banc).
142. As noted above, Mr. Smith's mother testified to his mental illness at the federal eviden-
tiary hearing. See Smith, 379 F.3d at 941.
143. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
144. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008), af'd on reh'g en banc sub
nom. Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009)
145. Id. at 1071.
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three aggravating circumstances: "(1) [that] the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) [that] the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3)
[that] it was probable that [Mr. Wilson] would ... constitute a continuing
threat to society."l46 The trial court followed the jury's recommendation
and sentenced Mr. Wilson to death.14 7
a. Mental Health Evidence Presented at Trial
Even though Mr. Wilson's counsel was appointed two years earlier,
he waited until three weeks before the trial to contact a mental health
expert.148 At that point, counsel hired a clinical psychologist, who then
proceeded to interview Mr. Wilson and administer several psychological
tests. The psychologist also reviewed school and medical records, and
read statements from five of Mr. Wilson's acquaintances. 149
During the sentencing proceedings, Mr. Wilson's counsel called six
witnesses in support of the case for mitigation: the psychologist, two
acquaintances from church, two teachers, and Mr. Wilson's mother. The
psychologist testified that Mr. Wilson's IQ of 126 placed him in the su-
perior range of intelligence, which meant that Mr. Wilson could "do
something with himself."15 0 The psychologist only briefly described the
results of the other tests that he had administered. In particular, the psy-
chologist informed the jury that Mr. Wilson had experienced "a severe
mental disorder with many of the personality scales elevated," and
"[t]hat would suggest that he has a severe personality disturbance." 51
The psychologist also presented a brief social history of Mr. Wilson. He
described Mr. Wilson's father as someone who was active in drugs and
alcohol and not involved in his son's life. The psychologist offered two
pictures of Mr. Wilson: "On the one hand, you have the picture of the
Sunday school-going child. On the other hand, you have the picture of
the gang and the uninvolved father, who did not set a particularly good
role model."15 2
The psychologist did not inform the jury of a more specific conclu-
sion that he had drawn from the tests he administered before trial "that
Mr. Wilson suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder
(severe without psychotic features), and post-traumatic stress disorder"
as well as indications of "paranoid personality disorder . .. with passive-
aggressive and schizotypal personality features." 53 During cross-
146. Id. at 1072 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4), (5), (7) (West 2002)).
147. Wilson, 536 F.3d 1064 at 1072.
148. Id. at 1074-75.
149. Id. at 1075.
150. Id. at 1076.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1075.
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examination-which the Tenth Circuit would later describe as "a train
wreck for Mr. Wilson"' 5 4 -the psychologist agreed with the prosecutor
that Mr. Wilson's test results supported the conclusion that Mr. Wilson
was "a psychopath" and was "the most likely to reoffend, based on the
studies."'15 The prosecutor invoked this testimony during closing argu-
ment, calling Mr. Wilson a "psychopathic killer based on the evi-
dence."' 5 6
During the mitigation phase, Mr. Wilson's church acquaintances
described him as "mannerable," "respectful," and "intelligent." 57 Mr.
Wilson's teachers, who had not seen him for five to six years, described
him as "respectful," "fun-loving," and a "very good student."' 5 8
Finally, Mr. Wilson's mother briefly testified, discussing Mr. Wil-
son's father and Mr. Wilson's participation in church.
b. New Mental Health Evidence on Appeal
During the direct appeal, Mr. Wilson's new counsel provided the
psychologist with additional school and social service records as well as
affidavits from Mr. Wilson's mother, sister, brother, and girlfriend (who
was also the mother of his child). The psychologist then performed a
second series of tests, which supported a diagnosis of paranoid schizo-
phrenia. The psychologist further reported that Mr. Wilson had a "severe
psychological disturbance with the possibility of delusions or hallucina-
tions."' 59 According to the psychologist, "Mr. Wilson believed that 'evil
spirits' possessed him at times, and . . . it was 'possible [Mr. Wilson]
could have been delusional at the time of the crime. Io60 In his view, this
information "may have helped the jury better understand [Mr. Wilson's]
emotional illness and how he could have participated in the crime."'61
The family members' affidavits also revealed new information that
had not been disclosed to the jury: Mr. Wilson suffered from depression,
concentration problems, and delusions. He heard voices and had frequent
memory lapses. Throughout his life, Mr. Wilson had experienced violent
nightmares, and he often suffered severe headaches that lasted for hours
and sometimes days. The affidavits further stated that Mr. Wilson's fa-
ther and brother were involved with drugs and gangs and that Mr. Wilson
had been surrounded by gang activity as he grew up. In an affidavit filed
in the direct appeal, the psychologist explained that his trial testimony
154. Id. at 1076.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1075.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1077.
160. Id. (second alteration in original).
161. Id.
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"could have been improved upon enormously [if he had] been provided
with the additional information [from the family members]." 6 2
Based on this new information from the psychologist and the family
members, Mr. Wilson argued on direct appeal that he had received inef-
fective assistance of counsel. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected that claim, reasoning that the "mere fact [that] more evidence
could have been presented is not, in itself, sufficient to show counsel was
deficient."'16 3 Adjudicating Mr. Wilson's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition, the federal district court concluded that the Oklahoma court's
ruling was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.
c. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis of Mr. Wilson's New Mental
Health Evidence and His Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claim
Mr. Wilson's appeal to the Tenth Circuit produced three opinions
from the panel: the principal opinion by Judge McConnell, a concurrence
by Judge Hartz, and a dissent by Judge Tymkovich.
Judge McConnell concluded that Mr. Wilson had established defi-
cient performance under Strickland. As to prejudice, Judge McConnell
observed, "It would be difficult, on this record, to conclude with any
confidence that the jury's verdict would not have been affected by a
proper presentation of the mental health evidence and related family his-
tory." 64 Because the federal district court had not reached the question of
prejudice and because the facts alleged by Mr. Wilson, if true, would
entitle him to a new sentencing proceeding at which the additional men-
tal health evidence could be presented, Judge McConnell concluded that
Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance claim should be remanded to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing.'ss
Judge Hartz did not join in Judge McConnell's analysis of Mr. Wil-
son's claim, but he concurred in the result.' 66 In contrast, Judge
Tymkovich dissented from Judge McConnell's analysis and the remand
to the district court. In his view, Mr. Wilson had established neither defi-
cient performance nor prejudice.16 7 Each of the opinions offers a differ-
ent assessment of Mr. Wilson's mental health evidence.
162. Id.
163. Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Douglas v. State, 951
P.2d 651, 680 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997)).
164. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093.
165. See id. at 1086.
166. See id. at 1123-25 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). After re-
mand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. On February 11, 2011, the court issued an
opinion rejecting Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court concluded that the
additional mental evidence offered at the evidentiary hearing would not have affected the jury's
decision to impose the death penalty. 2011 WL 744661, at *26.
167. See id. at 1125-48 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In Judge McConnell's view, the Supreme Court's decisions in Wil-
liams and Wiggins, as well as its 2005 decision in Rompilla v. Beard,168
emphasized "the importance of thorough investigation-in particular, of
mental health evidence-in preparation for the sentencing phase of a
capital trial."1 69 He contrasted the application of the Strickland standard
in these cases to the narrower application in cases like Burger v. Kemp.
In his view, Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla established three im-
portant principles. "First, the question is not whether counsel did some-
thing; counsel must conduct a full investigation and pursue reasonable
leads when they become evident."l 7 0 Second, in determining what consti-
tutes a reasonable investigation, the court should first look to the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards for capital defense work.17' Finally, "be-
cause of the crucial mitigating role that evidence of a poor upbringing
... can have in the sentencing phase, defense counsel must pursue this
avenue of investigation with due diligence."1 72
From those principles, Judge McConnell concluded that: (a) coun-
sel's failure to hire the psychologist until three weeks before trial, (b) his
failure to interview family members, and (c) his failure to fully present to
the jury the mental health assessment that the psychologist had already
made constituted deficient performance. The first two deficiencies were
apparent from the text of the ABA Guidelines, which stated that "prepa-
ration for the sentencing phase, in the form of investigation, should begin
immediately upon counsel's entry into the case" 73 and that counsel
should consider "[w]itnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the
client's life . . . , from birth to the time of sentencing."1 74
168. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). In Rompilla, the Court concluded that the defendant had received
ineffective assistance of counsel even though counsel had interviewed five family members and
three experts who evaluated the defendant's mental health at the time of the offense. However,
counsel failed to examine a file regarding a prior conviction on which the prosecution relied in
arguing for the death penalty. That file would have led to "a range of mitigation leads that no other
source had opened up." Id. at 390. The information that counsel could have discovered included the
fact that the defendant was "reared in [a] slum environment ... came to [the] attention of juvenile
authorities, quit school at 16, [and] started a series of incarcerations . . . commonly related to
over-indulgence in alcoholic beverages." Id. at 390-91 (first, third, and fourth alterations in origi-
nal). "The same file disclose[d] test results that the defense's mental health experts would have
viewed as pointing to schizophrenia and other disorders, and test scores showing a third grade level
of cognition after nine years of schooling." Id. at 391. In the Court's view, "The accumulated entries
would have destroyed the benign conception of [the defendant's] upbringing and mental capacity
defense counsel had formed from talking with [the defendant] himself and some of his family mem-
bers, and from the reports of the mental health experts." Id Thus, the defendant had established both
deficient performance and prejudice and was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding.
169. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1083.
170. Id. at 1084.
171. Id. at 1084-85.
172. Id. at 1085.
173. Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.8.3 (1989)).
174. Id. at 1087 (first alteration in original) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.8.3 (1989)).
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As to the mental health evidence that Mr. Wilson's counsel had ac-
tually presented, Judge McConnell observed that the psychologist had
testified about Mr. Wilson's mental illness in only the most general
terms, stating that Mr. Wilson had a "severe mental disorder with many
of the personality scales elevated" and that these elevated scales sug-
gested that Mr. Wilson had "a severe personality disturbance." 7 The
absence of a more particular explanation of Mr. Wilson's mental illness
meant that the jurors could have regarded that illness as antisocial behav-
ior or "meanness,"176 rather than as providing an explanation for Mr.
Wilson's behavior that could support his argument for a life sentence.
The lack of specificity also left Mr. Wilson without an effective means of
responding to the prosecution's claim that he was a psychopath.
As to prejudice, Judge McConnell's acknowledged that the issue
was close. He wrote that "[t]here may well be grounds for skepticism" 77
that the jury could have been convinced to impose a life sentence if the
psychologist had provided the more thorough diagnosis at which he later
arrived. Yet, invoking Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases on the
importance of mental health evidence, including Penry, Rompilla, Ed-
dings, and Smith, he noted that the court did not "write on a blank
slate" 78 and that such evidence could not be summarily discounted. 17 9
Mr. Wilson's particular diagnosis added support to his claim of
prejudice. In Judge McConnell's view:
Diagnoses of specific mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipo-
lar, which are associated with abnormalities of the brain and can be
treated with appropriate medication, are likely to be regarded by a
jury as more mitigating than generalized personality disorders, which
are diagnosed on the basis of reported behavior, are generally insepa-
rable from personal identity, and are often untreatable through medi-
cal or neurological means.lso
In addition, based on this diagnosis, the psychologist could have
testified about the ways in which Mr. Wilson could not conform his con-
duct to the law. And, the psychologist's testimony could have been but-
tressed by personal narratives from members of Mr. Wilson's family.1 '
175. Id. at 1091.
176. Id (quoting Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1144 (10th Cir. 2007)).
177. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093.
178. Id
179. See id at 1093-94. Like the Smith panel, Judge McConnell cited empirical studies dem-
onstrating that "mental health evidence has a mitigating effect on juries." Id. at 1096 n.4. He also
noted that there were some conflicting studies, that most of the data on which the studies were based
was more than ten years old, and that more investigation would be useful. Id.
180. Id at 1094.
181. Id. (stating that "[t]here is evidence that expert testimony on mental illness is most power-
ful when combined with narratives from lay witnesses such as family and friends") (citing Scott E.
Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay
Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1163-64, 1185 (1997)).
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Finally, Judge McConnell's opinion acknowledged the potential
"double-edged sword effect" of Mr. Wilson's mental health evidence.
Agreeing that "[t]his [double-edged sword effect] could possibly be
true,"' 82 he added:
[I]f true[,] the point would apply not just to this case, but also to [the
Supreme Court's decisions in] Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, as
well as [the Tenth Circuit's decisions in] Anderson, Smith, and many
more decisions across the country holding that the failure of counsel
to present mental health evidence of this sort was prejudicial.
In Judge McConnell's view, those precedents did not allow the
court to reject Mr. Wilson's claim of prejudice on the grounds that the
mental health evidence was double-edged. He invoked the Tenth Cir-
cuit's statement in Smith that this kind of mental health evidence is "ex-
actly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from jurors."l 84
Moreover, in order to establish prejudice, Mr. Wilson was required
to show only a reasonable probability that one juror would have voted
differently. Although the additional mental health evidence might not
have persuaded some jurors, Judge McConnell thought it just as likely
that the additional evidence would have led at least one juror to have
empathized with Mr. Wilson to the extent of returning a life sentence.
Although Judge Hartz did not join in Judge McConnell's analysis of
Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance claim, he did agree that the case
should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. In his view, Mr. Wilson's
allegations, if true, would entitle him to relief. The record did not under-
mine his claim of deficient performance, and although "[p]erhaps the
record undermines the claim of prejudice, . . . that issue was not ad-
dressed by the district court and should not be resolved in the first in-
stance by [the Tenth Circuit]." '
Judge Hartz did express doubts about the strength of Mr. Wilson's
claim. He shared many of Judge Tymkovich's thoughts about the perils
of presenting mental health evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.
He thought it plausible that Mr. Wilson's counsel might have reasonably
decided, in light of the evidence of guilt (including a videotape of Mr.
Wilson's conduct during the robbery and murder at the convenience
store), that "a claim of mental illness would not get very far with the jury
or would even be counterproductive." However, the record did not
establish that counsel actually made such a decision, and Supreme Court
182. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1095.
183. Id. at 1095-96.
184. Id. at 1096 (quoting Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004)).
185. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1124 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
186. Id.
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precedent set a high standard for counsel in investigating and evaluating
mental health evidence.
In contrast, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Tymkovich offered a
detailed explanation as to why Mr. Wilson's counsel's performance was
not deficient. In his view, counsel's pretrial investigation uncovered the
bulk of the information that Mr. Wilson later submitted in the direct ap-
peal, and counsel made a reasonable strategic judgment not to delve any
further into Mr. Wilson's mental health problems in his sentencing pres-
entation, but instead to emphasize his intelligence and capacity for re-
form. In contrast, the presentation of a schizophrenia diagnosis to the
jury "could have made [Mr.] Wilson's mental health problems appear
more intractable and untreatable, . . . add[ing] ammunition to the prose-
cution's case that [Mr.] Wilson was a dangerously ill person." Judge
Tymkovich invoked scholarship recognizing that "a mitigation defense
based purely on the defendant's mental health can be risky."'88 As to
prejudice, Judge Tymkovich noted that the jury had already heard evi-
dence regarding Mr. Wilson's mental illness; there was no reasonable
probability that the additional information from a more specific diagnosis
would have led the jury to impose a life sentence.189
2. Wilson's Significance
In many ways, the opinions in Wilson reflect the same conflict over
the proper assessment of mental health evidence as the opinions in
Bryan. Just as in Bryan, one opinion found the mental health evidence
that the jury did not hear was highly mitigating, while the another saw in
that same evidence a double-edged sword that defense counsel justifiably
withheld from the jury to reduce the chance that it would find the defen-
dant "dangerously ill." 90 Moreover, the fact that Bryan and Wilson come
out differently-that the earlier case affirms the denial of relief on the
grounds that the unpresented mental health evidence had an aggravating
edge while the latter one remands for an evidentiary hearing because of
the mitigating effect of that evidence-makes it difficult to discern a
standard that can offer guidance in assessing similar evidence in future
cases.
187. Id. at I139 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 1139-40; see also RUSSELL STETLER, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND MITIGATION 1
(2001), available at http://www.nynd-fpd.org/mental health/mental health mitigation.pdf (noting
counsel's task to "overcome juror cynicism toward mental health issues in criminal cases"); James
M. Doyle, The Lawyers'Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 442-
46 (1996) (noting difficulties of presenting mental illness as mitigation evidence); Leona D.
Jochnowitz, Missed Mitigation: Counsel's Evolving Duty to Assess and Present Mitigation at Death
Penalty Sentencing, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, I (2007) (noting tendency of counsel to limit mitigation
evidence "because it purportedly undermines residual doubt, because it has a double-edged effect of
inspiring jury fears, or because it opens the door to unrevealed criminal history"); Sundby, supra
note 181, at 1130-39 (explaining capital juror skepticism of mental health expert witnesses).
189. See Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1147 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id.atl39.
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Yet, in our view, there are some significant matters on which the
Wilson opinions offer meaningful direction. First, Judge Hartz's concur-
rence agrees with Judge McConnell's view of the importance of thor-
oughly investigating potentially mitigating mental health evidence.' 9' As
some scholars have noted, the Supreme Court's older ineffective assis-
tance of counsel opinions-like Strickland and Burger-permit rather
cursory investigation of mental health evidence, reasoning that the un-
presented evidence might support the prosecution's argument for aggra-
vating factors.192 The more recent cases (Williams, Wiggins and Rom-
pilla) require a comprehensive investigation, following the ABA Guide-
lines view that "[d]ue to the extraordinary and irrevocable nature of the
[death] penalty, at every stage of the proceedings counsel must make
'extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused."'l 93 In its view of coun-
sel's obligations, Wilson sides with the newer cases.194
Second, Wilson emphasizes that a court assessing an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim based on the failure to present mental health
evidence must examine the particular kind of evidence at issue. Some of
that evidence, like that presented by the psychologist at the initial sen-
tencing, may have only limited effect, while other evidence, like that
presented after the psychologist had time to review more records and
conduct more tests, may be significantly mitigating. Although Judge
Hartz's concurrence does not endorse the details of Judge McConnell's
analysis of the mental evidence, at the very least one can conclude that
he was persuaded to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing based on
the difference between the mental health evidence offered at sentencing
and the mental health evidence offered subsequently in Mr. Wilson's
direct appeal.
Third, Judge McConnell and Judge Hartz agree that the fact that
certain mental health evidence may have a double edge does not end the
inquiry. Further examination of that evidence may be useful in determin-
ing whether the defendant has established an ineffective assistance claim
under Strickland and is therefore entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
191. Id. at 1124-25 (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that "Judge McConnell's opinion estab-
lishes that the Supreme Court has set a high standard for defense counsel in capital cases with le-
spect to investigating mitigation thoroughly before settling on a strategy").
192. Christopher Seeds, Strategery's Refuge, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 987, 1012
(2009).
193. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES § 1.1 cmt. introduction (2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 923
(2003).
194. Professor Seeds observes that "[the Supreme Court's] new cases emphasize the need for
comprehensive life history investigation and endorse the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines, but leave
the old law of Burger.. .standing." Seeds, supra note 192, at 1012.
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D. The Double-Edged Sword After Wilson
The Wilson opinions also suggest several areas in which the law of
the circuit may offer further guidance for assessing mental health evi-
dence at issue in ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases.
1. A Threshold Standard for Assessing Mental Health Evidence
Wilson's careful consideration of the defendant's particular diagno-
sis and its potential mitigating effect suggests that it may be useful in
these circumstances to develop a threshold standard for evaluating men-
tal health evidence-one that explains what sort of mental evidence is
potentially mitigating enough to warrant further inquiry.' 95 In fact, three
Tenth Circuit cases decided after Wilson suggest that such a standard
may be developing: Gardner v. Galetka,196 Fairchild v. Workman,197 and
Young v. Sirmons.198
In Gardner, just as in Wilson, a capital defendant alleged in a fed-
eral habeas corpus action that a psychologist had been given insufficient
time to prepare a presentation at sentencing about the mitigating effects
of mental health evidence. Counsel contacted the psychologist only two
days before the sentencing proceedings began.199
Despite that extreme delay, the Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Su-
preme Court's conclusion that the delay was not prejudicial was a rea-
sonable application of Strickland.200 Although he had minimal time to
prepare, the psychologist had testified at the sentencing about the defen-
dant's unstable background and his family's history of criminal and sub-
stance abuse. 20 1 The psychologist did offer additional testimony in state
post-conviction proceedings. However, the difference between that tes-
timony and his testimony at sentencing was unlike the "enormous" dif-
ference in the two assessments made by the psychologist in Wilson. In
Gardner, there was nothing close to the "potent ... form of mitigation"
in Wilson-evidence of schizophrenia that was associated with
abnormalities of the brain and could be treated.202
The court made a similar distinction in Fairchild, concluding that a
capital defendant had presented only a "general and unfocused" argu-
195. See Samy Khalil, Note, Doing the Impossible: Appellate Reweighing of Harm and Mitiga-
tion in Capital Cases After Williams v. Taylor, with a Special Focus on Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 193,
209-18 (2001). The author argues that "once an appellate court finds that a defense attorney has
failed to uncover and present a certain 'threshold' amount of mitigating evidence, the court should
set aside a death sentence automatically, whatever the aggravating circumstances of a crime." Id. at
217. I do not make that argument here.
196. 568 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2009).
197. 579 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2009).
198. 551 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2008).
199. Gardner, 568 F.3d at 880.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 883.
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ment in state court proceedings that his trial counsel did not present evi-
dence of conduct that could have caused head injuries (drug use, fight-
ing, and amateur boxing), but that the defendant had then presented a
potentially meritorious claim in federal court, one based on the claim that
counsel had failed to investigate available evidence that the defendant
suffered from organic brain damage.203
Finally, in Young, the court held that new mental health evidence
offered in state-post conviction proceedings would not have had a sig-
nificant mitigating effect, and it offered some explanation for that as-
sessment.204 In the post-conviction proceedings, the defendant had pre-
sented affidavits from family members, friends, and two psychologists,
and he claimed that his counsel should have presented that evidence at
sentencing.205 Concluding that the defendant had failed to establish
prejudice under Strickland, the court stated that none of the evidence was
"so unusual as to place [the defendant] outside the realm of the average
,,206person. Unlike many capital defendants, the defendant appeared to
have had a generally normal and happy childhood.207 In the court's view,
the two psychologists' affidavits did not establish that the causes of the
defendant's emotional distress were "substantially out of the ordi-
nary." 208 One of them concluded that the defendant likely suffered from a
"Compulsive Personality Disorder," but he added that "[t]his type of
psychiatric disorder is not typically associated with the commission of
homicide." 20 9 That concession deprived the diagnosis of the kind of ex-
planatory power of other kinds of mitigating mental health evidence.210
In my view, these decisions are helpful in clarifying the court's as-
sessment of mental health evidence in ineffective assistance claims, and
in grappling with its potential double-edged effects. A defendant's evi-
dence may fall short of a threshold standard for mitigating effect for a
variety of reasons: because it does not sufficiently explain the defen-
dant's conduct, because it would likely fail to elicit sympathy from a
sentencing jury, or, under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Williams,
because it would not "influence[] the jury's appraisal of [the defendant's]
moral culpability" or show that "his [or her] violent behavior was a com-
203. Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1149-51 (10th Cir. 2009). The court therefore
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the defendant should be al-
lowed to exhaust his claim. Id. at 1155.
204. Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942, 968-69 (10th Cir. 2008).
205. Id. at 961-66.
206. Id. at 968.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (alteration in original).
210. See, e.g., Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 943 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation, brain damage, and troubled background could explain "these
outbursts of violence and [how they] caused this 'kind hearted' person to commit such a shocking
crime").
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pulsive reaction rather than the product of cold-blooded premedita-
tion."211
By articulating a threshold standard regarding the mitigating effect
of mental health evidence, the Tenth Circuit may be able to offer useful
guidance to courts adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
In particular, if the additional mental health evidence falls short of that
threshold standard, then courts need not assess its potential aggravating
effects. On the other hand, if the evidence meets that standard, then an
explanation of why that standard has been met may assist courts in
weighing the mitigating and aggravating effects.
2. Assessment of the Aggravating Effects of Mental Health Evi-
dence on an Incremental Basis
Professors John Blume and Shari Lynn Johnson are two of the
harshest critics of the courts' application of the double-edged sword
analysis in assessing mental health evidence in ineffective assistance
claims in capital cases.2 12 They write that the doctrine is "[e]mpirically
[i]ndefensable and [d]octrinally [d]isastrous."2 13 Yet Professors Blume
and Johnson acknowledge that some evidence concerning a defendant's
mental health can be aggravating. For example, if the defendant tortured
his victim, evidence of that conduct, although it indicated mental illness,
would more likely support the prosecution's argument for the death pen-
alty than rebut it.214
Nevertheless, Blume and Johnson object to the way in which the
double-edged sword conception of mental illness evidence can truncate
the Strickland inquiry. Criticizing the Fourth Circuit's decisions, they
observe that "[t]here is no need to calculate prejudice in the context of
the case, because the Fourth Circuit simply presumes lack of prejudice
by affixing the 'double-edged' label to the unpresented mitigating evi-
dence." 215
211. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000).
212. See generally John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Dou-
ble-Edged Sword": Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right
to the Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480 (1999).
213. Id at 1501. Professors Blume and Johnson contend that "[t]he double-edged sword doc-
trine hypothesizes that evidence that seems intuitively mitigating may be, in the minds of some
jurors, actually aggravating." Id. at 1502. They reason that, for some subset ofjurors, "psychological
evidence which decreases the defendant's moral culpability may be interpreted as also increasing his
future dangerousness, and for some subset of this subset, that that increase in perceived future
dangerousness will outweigh the decrease in perceived culpability, thereby increasing the likelihood
of a death sentence." Id. In their view, even though this empirical proposition is "undoubtedly true,"
it does not establish that a jury would be more likely to return a death sentence because of this evi-
dence. Id That is because not all jurors will share this view of the connection between mental health
evidence and future dangerousness. See id. They also argue that the Strickland standards are suffi-
cient to analyze deficient performance and prejudice, without the gloss of the double-edged sword
doctrine. Id. at 1504-07.
214. Id. at 1502-03.
215. Id. at 1506.
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In my view, the Tenth Circuit has sometimes engaged in similar la-
beling and, as a result, has not undertaken a case-specific analysis of the
mental health evidence at issue. As I have noted, in concluding that the
mental health evidence that had not been presented until the post-
conviction proceedings was double-edged, the court in Bryan relied upon
testimony from one of the defendant's attorneys that "evidence of a psy-
chological problem with the defendant . . . can sometimes be a double-
edged sword." 216 The former counsel admitted that "in several cases" the
jury had accepted "evidence of psychological or emotional problems as
evidence of aggravation."217 There is scant discussion in the majority
opinion of the particular mental illness suffered by the defendant and
whether the jury would have regarded that particular illness as aggravat-
ing or mitigating.
As I have noted, the Tenth Circuit's decisions have offered three
explanations of the ways in which juries may perceive mental health
evidence as an aggravating circumstance. First, the evidence may support
the prosecution's contention that the defendant is impulsive and violent,
and therefore a continuing threat. Second, it may undermine a theme or
contention that the defendant has offered in the guilt phase of the trial or
as part of the case for mitigation (for example that the defendant did not
commit the crime or played a minimal role in it or that, except for the
crime at issue, the defendant has been a good citizen). Third, the mental
health evidence may reveal particular instances of other criminal or anti-
social behavior that could support the prosecution's arguments that ag-
gravating circumstances justify the death penalty. Yet, for each of these
potential aggravating aspects of the mental health evidence, there may be
case-specific reasons why a jury might not perceive the evidence to sup-
port a death sentence.
Most importantly, the defendant's mental illness may be treatable.
Indeed, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, Judge McConnell's
opinion in Wilson relies in part on medical literature indicating that the
symptoms of the schizophrenia suffered by the defendant there could
improve with medication.218
Similarly, the commentary to the ABA Guidelines cites studies
showing that "future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital ju-
rors, and is thus at issue in virtually all capital trials, whether or not it is
argued by the prosecution or is a statutorily mandated sentencing consid-
eration."219 However, in light of juries' overriding concern with defen-
216. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1223 n.21 (10th Cir. 2003).
217. Id.
218. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1094 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that "[d]iagnoses of
specific mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipolar. . . are associated with abnormalities of the
brain and can be treated with appropriate medication").
219. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES § 10.11 cmt. (2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 1062 (2003)
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dants' future dangerousness, the Guidelines' directive is not to avoid the
presentation of mental health evidence. Instead, the commentary ex-
plains, "[C]ounsel should give serious consideration to making an ex-
plicit presentation of information on [the defendant's future
dangerousness]."220 In addition to testimony about the treatment of the
mental illness, the evidence could include information about the defen-
dant's adaptation to the prison environment or other evidence rebutting
the continuing threat allegation.221
With regard to the possibility that mental illness evidence may con-
flict with other themes or contentions offered by the defense, I note that
222the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Wiggins. There, the defen-
dant's attorney had argued during the guilt stage that the defendant was
not directly responsible for the murder.2 23 Although the Court stated that
it might have been strategically defensible for an attorney to have pur-
sued that theme during the guilt phase, such a strategy was not necessar-
ily inconsistent with the presentation of the defendant's troubled back-
ground during sentencing.224 In addition, in light of the strength of the
available mitigation evidence that the defendant's attorney's did not pre-
sent, a reasonable attorney might have focused on the mitigation case at
sentencing rather than the weaker arguments during the guilt phase. Ac-
cordingly, with regard to the potential conflict between mental evidence
and other defense themes and contentions, there may well be case-
specific considerations indicating that the evidence is not double-edged,
at least not to the degree that reasonable counsel should completely ex-
clude it from the mitigation case.
Similar case-specific considerations may apply to the instances of
criminal or anti-social behavior that mental health evidence may reveal.
The Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Porter v. McCollum225 illustrates
that point.
In Porter, the Court overturned an Eleventh Circuit decision, con-
cluding that the Florida Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Strick-
land, and held that the defendant's counsel's performance was both defi-
cient and prejudicial.226 Counsel had failed to present evidence that his
client had served in horrific battles in the Korean War, had struggled to
recover upon return from the war, had a childhood history of physical
abuse, and had been diagnosed with brain abnormalities.2 27 In rejecting
(quoting John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue", 86
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398-99 (2001)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515 (2003).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 535.
225. 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam).
226. Id. at 452-55.
227. Id. at 453.
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the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Florida Su-
preme Court had concluded that counsel's failure to offer the military
records was not prejudicial because they revealed that the defendant had
28gone AWOL on several occasions and had been court-martialed. In its
view, "These periods of desertion would have significantly impacted
upon any mitigating effect that the evidence would have had, and indeed
they would have reduced this impact to inconsequential proportions."229
The Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that the evidence that
the defendant was AWOL was consistent with the overall theory of miti-
gation that he had presented in post-conviction proceedings-that his
combat experience caused immense stress and substantial emotional and
mental difficulties. 23 0 The Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that the
AWOL evidence was merely aggravating "reflect[ed] a failure to engage
with what [the defendant] actually went through in Korea." 231
Porter thus supports the view that even though mental health evi-
dence may reveal instances of criminal or antisocial behavior, that fact
may not justify withholding the evidence from the jury. As in Porter, the
explanatory impact of that mental health evidence may outweigh its ag-
gravating effects. 23 2 The potential double-edged quality of mental health
evidence should therefore trigger a case-specific inquiry rather than fore-
close it.
3. Sears v. Upton233
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on mental health evi-
dence in capital cases offers further support for the fact-specific approach
to assessing mental heath evidence. In Sears, the evidence that defen-
dant's counsel failed to present included the defendant's childhood expe-
riences of sexual abuse, a severe learning disability, and brain damage
caused by several serious head injuries and drug and alcohol abuse. In
post-conviction proceedings, the Georgia trial court agreed with the de-
fendant that his counsel's performance was deficient, but it rejected his
claim of prejudice, reasoning that because his counsel had presented a
reasonable alternative theory of mitigation-involving the impact of the
228. Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 924-25 (Fla. 2001).
229. Id. at 925.
230. Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455.
231. Id.
232. The Third Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009), follows the
reasoning of Porter. Even though the defendant's mental health history, which his counsel had failed
to present, included evidence that the defendant was "a sadistic and dangerous sexual deviate who
committed at least one prior act" that resembled the crime at issue, the court concluded that the
defendant's mental health history acted "as a common thread that ties all this evidence together." Id.
at 129. "A single juror may well have believed that this unifying factor explained [the defendant's]
horrific actions in a way that lowered his culpability and thereby diminished the justification for
imposing the death penalty." Id.
233. 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010).
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defendant's execution on the defendant's family-any finding of preju-
dice would be speculative.
The Court identified two errors in the Georgia court's analysis.
First, the state court's finding that the defendant's counsel had formu-
lated a mitigation theory that was reasonable "in the abstract,"234 did not
excuse it from engaging in a fact-specific prejudice inquiry. Second, the
court should have considered the new mental health evidence, along with
the evidence that counsel actually presented, to determine whether the
defendant had established a reasonable probability of a different result. 23 5
The Supreme Court therefore remanded the case to the Georgia court for
a "probing and fact-specific analysis" 23 6 of the prejddice component of
the defendant's ineffective assistance claim.
Significantly, the Court remanded for that inquiry even though
some of the omitted mental health evidence was double-edged. As Jus-
tice Scalia observed in his dissent, a psychiatrist who examined the de-
fendant found him to be "a narcissist" with a "grandiose" opinion of
himself, as well as "arrogant and self-centered."23 7 However, even
though the dissent concluded that it was more likely that the defendant's
"profound personality disorder, . . . made him exactly the kind of person
who would commit heinous crimes in the future," a majority of the Su-
preme Court was not convinced that this assessment of the mental health
evidence should foreclose further inquiry. Instead, in the majority's view,
competent counsel "should have been able to turn some of the adverse
evidence into a positive-perhaps in support of a cognitive deficiency
mitigation theory."238 Although the evidence might not have made the
defendant more likeable to the jury, the Court concluded, "it might well
have helped the jury understand [the defendant], and his horrendous
acts."239
The Court's decision in Sears thus confirms both the explanatory
force of mental health evidence that the Tenth Circuit recognized in
Smith and the importance of the fact-specific inquiry addressed in Wil-
son.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution requires a heightened standard of reliability in the
application of the death penalty. It also entitles the defendant in a capital
case to present evidence a broad range of mitigating evidence, including
evidence of his or her own mental illness. Yet when courts assess mental
234. Id. at 3265.
235. Id. at 3265-66.
236. Id. at 3266.
237. Id. at 3270 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 3264 (majority opinion).
239. Id.
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health evidence in capital cases, that heightened reliability often seems
hard to attain.
Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, Roderick Smith and Robert Leroy Bryan
received strikingly different opinions about the impact of the mental
health evidence that their trial counsel failed to present. One, Mr. Smith,
was informed by the court that the omitted evidence was highly mitigat-
ing, that his attorney's failure to present it violated his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, and that he was entitled to a new
sentencing hearing. The other, Mr. Bryan, learned that the additional
mental health evidence was a double-edged sword that his counsel had
made a reasonable strategic decision to exclude. The mental health evi-
dence that Mr. Bryan presented in habeas corpus proceedings was never
heard by a jury, and he was executed.
As troubling as those different results may be, the Smith and Bryan
decisions are each supported by Supreme Court precedent. The Court's
decisions hold that mental health evidence is sometimes mitigating,
sometime aggravating, and sometimes both. How a court will character-
ize the evidence in a particular case can be quite difficult to predict.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wilson further illustrates the chal-
lenges in assessing mental health evidence. There, the three panel mem-
bers reached three different conclusions. For Judge McConnell, Mr. Wil-
son's additional mental health evidence warranted further proceedings,
allowing him the opportunity to show a reasonable probability that, with
further insight into his mental state, a jury would have returned a life
sentence. In contrast, Judge Tymkovich concluded that the evidence
proffered by Mr. Wilson in post-conviction proceedings could have sup-
ported the prosecution's contention that he was a continuing threat and
that, as a result, his trial counsel made a reasonable strategic judgment to
exclude it. Judge Hartz, the third member of the Wilson panel, agreed
only with the result of Judge McConnell's analysis-that a remand for an
evidentiary hearing was warranted.
In my view, that narrow point of agreement offers some hope for
developing a more coherent approach to mental health evidence in capi-
tal cases. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area, beginning with
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla and continuing through its more recent
decisions in Porter and Sears indicate that the assessment of mental
health evidence not presented to a jury may depend on a number of case-
specific, fact-intensive considerations: whether the illness is treatable;
how the structured prison setting would affect it; whether evidence re-
garding the illness would have open the door for the prosecution to intro-
duce episodes of violent or antisocial conduct to support its contention
that the defendant was a continuing threat; whether the evidence would
have undermined another viable theme or argument of the defense; and
whether, despite potentially aggravating effects, the explanatory power
of additional mental health evidence would have outweighed its detri-
374 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:2
mental impact. As the Wilson panel concluded, evidentiary hearings may
allow those considerations to be more fully explored.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sears supports that view. There,
the Court drew a contrast between (1) a state appellate court's conclusion
that defense counsel's decision to exclude mental health evidence was
reasonable in the abstract; and (2) a probing and fact-specific analysis of
that evidence. It concluded that the latter was required. Although the
assessment of mental health evidence in capital cases will continue to
present enormously difficult challenges, the kind of inquiry required in
Sears may bring the courts closer to the heightened reliability that they
should strive to obtain.
